ABSTRACT. Relaxation algorithms provide a powerful method of finding noncooperative equilibria in general synchronous games. Through use of the NikaidoIsoda function, the Nash solution to a broad category of constrained, multiplayer, non-zerosum games can easily be found. We provide solutions to some simple games using this procedure and extend ourselves to more difficult games involving coupled constraints and multiple discrete time periods using a program developed in Matlab. 
INTRODUCTION
Game theory problems are renown for being difficult to solve, especially many player, non-zero sum and dynamic games. Computation of Nash equilibria using the Nikaido-Isoda function [4] and the relaxation algorithm [2] , [8] seems to be an attractive possibility in that the most advanced technique required is minimisation of a multivariate function; a well studied topic. The aim of this paper is to use the relaxation algorithm to find Nash equilibria in games of varying complexity.
The motivating paper [8] sets the foundation for the usage of the relaxation algorithm to find Nash normalised equilibria, and promises its success for a certain class of games. The contribution of the present paper is in applyinging this idea to some specific game theory problems and reporting on equilibrium computation experiments. The experiments below were conducted using customarily developed software in the Matlab programming environment.
In the latter stages of the paper, we are able to solve coupled constraints games, which force players to obey constraints based on their collective actions. Obeying such constraints relies on cooperation, however taxes can be enforced to ensure that players meet these constraints (see [3] .) We solve a coupled constraints game in a static and then a dynamic setting using the open loop information pattern. As analytical solutions to such games hardly ever exist, the strength of this paper is in studying a new computational-economics method suitable for finding equilibria in intertemporal ("open-loop") conflict situations.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 have a tutorial character and provide an introduction to some elementary concepts. In Section 4, we consider some simple examples which provide an insight into how the algorithm works. Section 5 applies the relaxation algorithm to a dynamic game.
Concluding remarks and an Appendix, which describes the software we developed, are at the end of the paper.
All definitions, theorems and such are numbered communally and consecutively in each section.
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
2.1. Conventions.
Convention 2.1. In this paper we will be considering two different levels of vector; each player in a game
will have an action, and all players together will have a collective action. To avoid notational confusion between the two and offer the reader some comfort, we will adopt the convention that a player ' (1)
We will use the notation
to denote the equilibrium point of the game where player i has action space and payoff functions X i and φ i respectively.
We now introduce the Nikaido-Isoda function [8] . This function is not so elementary in the realms of game theory, and bears some thinking about.
Definition 2.6. Let φ i be the payoff function for player i. Then the Nikaido-Isoda function
Result 2.7.
[8]
Let us take a brief look at the significance of this function. Each summand can be thought of as the improvement in payoff a player will receive by changing his action from x i to y i while all other players continue to play according to x. The function thus represents the sum of these improvements in payoff.
Note that the maximum value this function can take, for a given x, is always nonnegative, owing to Result 2.7 above. Also the function is everywhere nonpositive when either x or y is a Nash equilibrium point, since in an equilibrium situation no player can make a unilateral improvement to their payoff, and so each summand in this case can be at most zero.
From here, we reach the conclusion that when the Nikaido-Isoda function cannot be made (significantly) positive for a given y, we have (approximately) reached the Nash equilibrium point. We use this observation in constructing a termination condition for our algorithm; that is, we choose an ε such that, when max y2I R m Ψ(x s ; y) < ε, we have achieved the equilibrium to a sufficient degree of precision. (4) Notice that Rosen [6] also introduces the notion of a normalised equilibrium when examining equilibrium point uniqueness in concave n-person games. However, he defines it in a different context which is one of a game with coupled constraints. His definition will be presented when we deal with coupled constraints games in Section 4.2.
The two following lemmas are presented in [1]: Lemma 2.9. A Nash normalised equilibrium point is also a Nash equilibrium point.
Lemma 2.10. A Nash equilibrium point is a Nash normalised equilibrium point if the collective action
space X satisfies
An algorithm which uses the Nikaido-Isoda function to find the Nash normalised equilibrium will be developed in the next section. Here we note that at each point of the algorithm we wish to move towards a point which is an "improvement" on the one that we are at. To this end, let us put forward the following definition.
Definition 2.11. The optimum response function at point x is
Ψ(x; y): (6) In brief terms, this function returns the set of players' actions whereby they all attempt to unilaterally maximise their payoffs.
It is interesting to note that we can consider the algorithm as either performing a static optimisation or as calculating successive actions in a convergence to equilibrium in a real time process. We have been considering the case where all payoffs are known to us, in which case we can directly find the Nash equilibrium using the relaxation algorithm. However, if we only had access to one player's payoff function and all players' past actions, then at each stage in the real time process we choose the optimum response for that player, assuming that the other players will play as they had in the previous period. In this way, convergence to the Nash normalised equilibrium will occur as t ! ∞.
We now introduce some more technical definitions to be used in the main theorem. 
Definition 2.12. A function of one argument f
x; y 2 X ; 0 α 1; and r(x; y; z)
x; y 2 X ; 0 α 1; and µ(x; y; z)
r ( x ; y ; z ) and µ(x; y; z) are referred to as the residual terms.
The notions of weak convexity and concavity are weakenings of strict convexity and concavity. The residual terms, to be chosen at will, ensure that there are many concave functions which are weakly convex and many convex functions which are weakly concave.
In fact, the family of weakly convex-concave functions includes the family of smooth functions 1 [8] , and so this condition is a minimal restriction for practical purposes.
We now present an elementary example to illustrate the above ideas.
Example: A convex function which is weakly concave
Consider the function f : I R ! I R defined by
This function is convex in all senses. To show that it is weakly concave, we must find an r(x; y) such that, for all x; y 2 I R and
That is if and only if
(1 α)xy α(1 α)r(x; y) , ( The function r(x; y; z) was introduced with the concept of weak convex-concavity. In the case of Ψ(x; y) being a twice continuously differentiable function with respect to both arguments on X X, the residual terms satisfy r(x; y; y) = 1 2
and µ(y;
where A(x; x) = Ψ xx (x; y)j y=x is the Hessian of the Nikaido Isoda function with respect to the first argument and B(x; x) = Ψ yy (x; y)j y=x is the Hessian of the Nikaido-Isoda function with respect to the second argument, both evaluated at y = x.
To prove the inequality of Condition (5) 3. THE RELAXATION ALGORITHM 3.1. Statement of the algorithm. Suppose we wish to find the Nash equilibrium for some game and we have some initial estimate of it, say x 0 . The relaxation algorithm we use is
The iterate at step s + 1 is constructed by a weighted average of the improvement point Z(x s ) and the current point x s . This averaging ensures convergence of the algorithm under certain conditions, as stated in the following Theorem 3.1.
By taking sufficiently many iterations of the algorithm, it is our aim to determine the Nash equilibrium
x with arbitrary precision. Indeed Theorem 3.1 in the following subsection provides conditions for the convergence of this relaxation algorithm. where β is a strictly increasing function, 6 . the relaxation parameters α s satisfy
3.3.
Step size optimisation. In order for the algorithm to converge, we may choose any sequence (α s )
satisfying the final condition of Theorem 3.1. However, it is of computational importance to attempt to optimise the convergence rate.
Suitable step-sizes may be obtained by trial and error, and we have found that using a constant step of α s 0; 5 leads to a quick convergence in most of our experiments. In this case, we can think of the α s as being constant until our convergence conditions are reached, and thereafter decaying with factors 1 2 ; 1 3 ; 1 4 ; : : : . We suggest here a method for step-size optimisation. This method is intuitively appealing. Indeed, we are trying to force the maximum of the Nikaido-Isoda function that is an equilibrium condition.
Of course, we could also use two-step optimisation, or indeed n-step. However any number greater than one would be computationally expensive. We have found that one-step optimising the step sizes leads to fewer iterations, but that each step takes longer to complete than when using constant step sizes.
When we refer to optimal step sizes throughout the paper, we generally mean one-step optimal, however in some cases where optmisation is very simple, other more elementary methods have been used.
SOME SIMPLE EXAMPLES WITH STATIC GAMES
In this section we will consider some simple games in order to gain an appreciation for how the algorithm works in conjunction with the Nikaido-Isoda function.
4.1. Simple two player games.
A two player game with identical payoff functions.
Consider a two player game where both players are maximisers, the action space for each player is I R and the payoff functions of players 1 and 2 are identical. Consider the following simple payoff function on the region X = f(x 1 ; x 2 ) : 10 x 1 ; x 2 10g.
In this case the Nikaido Isoda function is:
(17)
Notice in this case that assumptions 1-5 of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied.
The Nash equilibrium for this game is clearly the maximum of the common payoff function, that is
The optimum response function Z(x) = arg max y2X Ψ(x; y) is determined by simple calculus to be (0; 0) for any x. Hence if we were to choose α 0 to be ε where 0 < ε 1, it doesn't matter what values we assign to α 1 ; α 2 ; : : : since we can choose ε such that x 1 satisfies our termination conditions, namely that the Nikaido-Isoda function
The convergence in the action space is displayed in Figure 1 for starting guess (10; 5).
A slightly less trivial example.
Consider the situation of Section 4.1.1, but let the common payoff function now be
The Nikaido-Isoda function in this case is
(19)
As in Section 4.1.1, the Nash equilibrium for this game is x = ( 0 ; 0 ) . The optimum response function is calculated to be Z(x) = 5 13 (x 2 ; x 1 ). In this case it is also relatively simple to see how to optimise the α s ; since both players have the same payoff function, the optimal α s is the one which optimises the payoff function
Our Matlab program (see Appendix) gives the results of Table I , with starting guess x = ( 10; 5), and using optimised step sizes α s .
The equilibrium point is still x = ( 0 ; 0 ) , but the algorithm does not converge directly to it. It rather comes in line with the equilibrium first, as seen in Figure 2 . We can now make a comparison between the optimised and nonoptimised α s . The first graph, with the optimisation performed, shows a much quicker convergence. In contrast the second one, which has α s 0:5 shows a smoother but much slower convergence. The third shows step sizes of α s 1 (that is, a non-relaxed algorithm.) We would clearly prefer to use optimised step sizes if this could be achieved easily.
Note that Theorem 3.1 gives no guarantee that the algorithm will converge at all in the second or third cases, despite our success.
4.1.3. The quantity setting duopoly. In this model, the players' payoff functions are not necessarily the same. Consider a situation where two firms sell an identical product on the same market [5] . Each firm will want to choose its production rates in such a way as to maximise its respective profits. Let x i be the production of firm i and let α, λ and ρ be constants. The market price is:
and the profit made by firm i, is:
leading to an optimum response function of
It is a classical result that the Nash equilibrium in this game is x
with corresponding payoff The convergence of the algorithm for the quantity setting duopoly is displayed in Figure 3 . Note that α s 0:5 here. Consider the solution to a game where the n players have payoff functions (φ i ) i=1:::n , arg equil x2X fφ 1 (x); : : : ; φ n ( x ) g (25) such that X is a convex subset of I R m . This shall be called a Rosen's coupled constraints game. In the special case where X = X 1 X n , the game is said to have uncoupled constraints.
Theorem 4.1. An equilibrium point exists for every concave n-person game.
So we know that if each player has a payoff function which is concave with respect to his own action while other players' actions remain fixed, then the game must have at least one Nash equilibrium.
The conditions for uniqueness in the case of uncoupled constraints rely on the concept of diagonal strict concavity. Put loosely, a game with this property is one in which each player has more control over his payoff than the other players have over it. This tells us that, if we can show that our game is diagonally strictly concave, then we can find a unique normalised equilibrium.
We will not prove the applicability of Theorem 3.1 to the coupled constraints game. We suggest this could be done if the components of the Nikaido-Isoda function were the players' Lagrangians rather than their payoffs φ i . Our numerical experiments do seem to indicate that the diagonal strict concavity, which guarantees a unique solution to this class of games, is a sufficient condition for the relaxation algorithm to find an equilibrium here. [3] . In this game, we consider three players j = 1; 2; 3 located along a river. Each agent is engaged in an economic activity at a chosen level x j , but the players must meet environmental conditions set by a local authority.
Formulation of a coupled constraints game. River Basin Pollution,
Pollutants may be expelled into the river, where they disperse. Two monitoring stations`= 1; 2 are located along the river, at which the local authority has set maximum pollutant concentration levels.
The revenue for player j is
with expenditure
Thus the net profit for player j is
The constraint imposed by the local authority at location l is
α j e j x j 100;`= 1; 2: Table II. The α j`a re the decay-transportation coefficients from player j to location l, and e j is the emission coefficient of player j, also given in Table II . In this case, we can check conditions (26) to show that problem (25) is a diagonally strictly concave one, and so a unique equilibrium point exists. We can thus compute it for a given set of weights r using our relaxation algorithm, where the optimum response function Z(x s ) is restricted to lie within the feasibility set R. Notice also that the region defined by Equation (36) is convex.
Solution to the River Basin Pollution game.
Here, we build the Nikaido-Isoda function. According to Section 4.2.1, its components should be the players' corresponding Lagrangian payoffs. However, we will formulate the Nikaido-Isoda function from the unconstrained game, letting the constraints be handled within the Matlab procedure.
To this end, the Nikaido-Isoda function is
We used a starting guess of x = ( 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) and α 0:5 in our Matlab program. The convergence is shown in Table III . 15 The convergence is displayed as a line in the 3D action space in Figure 4 . This game was also solved in [ Figure 4 4.2.4. Applying the Pigouvian taxes. Now that the Nash normalised equilibrium has been found, we can force the players to obey it by applying Pigouvian taxes. In this way we create a new, unconstrained game whose equilibrium is the same as that of the original.
For each active constraint, we place a tax on each player of the amount
where λ`is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint`at the equilibrium x = x .
For our game, recall that g`= q`is the constraint at location`,`= 1; 2, and that the only the first constraint is active.
Thus, in the river basin pollution game with the parameters given, the payoff function for player j
The coputations of Section 4.2.3 gave us the Lagrange multiplier value for the active constraint λ 1 = 0:5774. Thus, applying the taxes as above leads to the set of payoff functions φ j described by Equation (38), which has the unconstrained Nash equilibrium x = arg equil x2R m (φ 1 ; φ 2 ; φ 3 ; q 1 ; q 2 ) = x . That is, the new (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium is equal to the old (constrained) Nash normalised equilibrium.
We report that checking numerically the validity of the above is difficult (using the Matlab constr routine, see Appendix) due to the derivative discontinuities introduced by the max function. However, cross-sectional graphs of the payoff functions strongly vindicate the results (see Figure 6 ). The values for all constants will remain the same as in Section 4.2.2 over the period of the game.
State equations. Let x (t)
i denote the fully utilised production capacity that player i has at time t, governed by the state equation
where u (t) i is the investment that player i makes at time t, and µ i is the depreciation that applies to player i, and x (0) i is fixed, i = 1; 2; 3, t = 0; : : : ; T . Denote the collective action and state respectively by u = (u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 ) and (40) Payoff function. The present value payoff for player i is
where φ i (x (t) ) is defined through Equation ( Constraints. The constraints of Equation (36) for`= 1; 2 are to be satisfied by the x (t) for all t 2 f0;1; : : : ; T g . The current production capacity x (t) i must be nonnegative, but the u (t) i may be negative, in which case a withdrawal of capital would be indicated.
5.3. Solution to the game. We want to find the normalised Nash equilibrium arg equil u2U fΦ 1 ; Φ 2 ; Φ 3 g (45) subject to the state equations and constraints given above.
To do this using the relaxation algorithm, it is necessary to reformulate the payoff functions and constraints so that they contain only constants and the actions. That is, they need to be free of the states for us to start.
The reformulation for the payoff functions is
where the sums over s are interpreted as zero if t or T are respectively zero. The constraints become
for`= 1; 2 and t 2 f 0 ; 1 ; : : : T 1 g , where the sum over s is again treated as zero if t = 0.
In the rest of this section, we will be concerned with the players' first period actions, i.e. u
1 . The second period action depends on the parameters as follows:
We now solve the above game for some different parameter combinations. Given this information, and a starting guess of u = ( ( 0 ; 0 ) ; ( 0 ; 0 ) ; ( 0 ; 0 )), which is the expected outcome, the program output is the starting guess.
This is intuitively correct since we are just playing an identical game twice, with a penalty but no reward associated with investment, and thus expect the Nash solution for the single period to be repeated over both periods. The constraints' satisfaction in each period is the same as in the static game. With starting guess u = ( ( 0 ; 0 ) ; ( 0 ; 0 ) ; ( 0 ; 0 )), ρ was varied with the resulting payoff evolution shown in Table IV and resulting in the state evolution as in Figure 8 . Figure 9 compares the first period actions of the players (i.e. u Two periods with barely active constraints. We look here at how the Nash equilibrium behaves when a constraint is non-active in the first period (t = 0). In this way we can observe the behaviour of the players when constraints become active.
Redefine the constraints as
then the constraints are nonactive when the game is played for a single period. However, when we play for two periods and vary ρ, the constraints become active. Again, the payoffs are high when the discount factor is large. Regarding the players' actions shown in Figure 12 , they are such that for a certain value of ρ (here, ρ = :95 see Figure 11 ) the second constraint becomes binding. From this value of ρ "onwards" the least economic agent's actions (i.e. Player 3's; see his parameteres in Table II ) start diminishing.
The evolution of the state is shown for Player 1 in Figure 13 . We note that his capacities in period 1 surpass those of the "static" equilibrium, and grow in the discount factor. An apparently big jump in capacities in period 2 is mainly due to the relatively large weight of the scrap value in the agent's objective function. This together with the relaxation methodology allows us to find the Nash equilibrium of many nonzero sum multiplayer games in a much simpler fashion than has previously been possible. Software was developed to implement these ideas and has been used successfully to solve some nontrivial examples.
The games we solved included several elementary static games and some less elementary games including the dynamic river basin pollution game based on [3] . The latter was originally solved using Rosen's Algorithm.
The developed software enabled us to find the Nash normalised equilibrium of a two period dynamic game played under the open loop information pattern. In particular, we observed how varying the discount factor and capital depreciation influence the equilibrium.
We noted that if a one period game has a (static) Rosen normalised equilibrium that makes a constraint active, this constraint usually remains active in the dynamic game. The players' investment behaviour is such that the heaviest polluter should decrease production for the game to have an equilibrium. All players' payoffs decrease with a diminishing discount factor.
However, if a static game has an unconstrained static equilibrium, the dynamic equilibrium generally implies an increased production by all players and that (usually one of) the constraints becomes active.
Also, the more important the future becomes (i.e. ρ approaches 1) the "greedier" the players become and the more likely is an equilibrium with active constraints. In real life this may mean that players should be more strictly monitored for larger values of ρ. We summarise that in dynamic games with coupled constraints and a final payoff function, the equilibrium (45), with ρ ! 1, moves away from the static, or "repeated", equilibrium of Section 4.2.3.
Notice that all dynamic equilibria are Rosen normalised. In order to force the players to invest according to these equilibria, Pigouvian taxes can be imposed [3] .
The relaxation methodology increases the ability of game theory to solve ever more complex problems, and does so using simple ideas. 
